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SCOTLAND, ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND
AND THE IDEA OF BRITAIN
By Roger A. Mason
ABSTRACT. This paper explores aspects of Anglo-Scottish relations in Elizabeth’s
reign with particular emphasis on the idea of dynastic union and the creation of a
Protestant British kingdom. It begins by examining the legacy of pre-Elizabethan
ideas of Britain and the extent to which Elizabeth and her government sought to
realise the vision of a Protestant and imperial British kingdom first articulated in the
late s. It then focuses on the issues arising from the deposition of Mary Queen
of Scots and her long captivity in England. The dynastic implications of Mary’s
execution in  are highlighted and it is argued that Elizabeth’s policy towards
James VI and Scotland betrays little or no interest in developing a truly British
agenda.
It is probably not in the best of taste, on an occasion such as this, to
introduce to the proceedings such an unwelcome guest as Mary Queen
of Scots. Yet no commemoration of Elizabeth and Elizabethan England
would be complete without the haunting spectre of the Tudor queen’s
cousin, dynastic rival and near-nemesis. Certainly no consideration of
contemporary Anglo-Scottish relations and the idea of a united British
kingdom can afford to ignore her. For nearly three decades, two-thirds of
Elizabeth’s forty-five-year reign, Mary Stewart not only cast a threatening
shadow over the Elizabethan regime but also hugely complicated English
attitudes to Scotland and Scottish attitudes to England. Mary’s execution
on  February , despite the history of indecision that lay behind it,
proved in the end a decisive moment in the dynastic history of both
England and Scotland, opening the way for the succession of James VI
to the English throne and the creation in  of an imperial British
monarchy. What follows is largely concerned with Scottish attitudes to
the Elizabethan regime and Elizabethan attitudes to Mary, James and the
future of Britain. First, however, it is as well to consider some of the
background to the issue of Anglo-Scottish union and the ideological
antecedents of the idea of Britain itself.
 The paper thus revisits themes first explored in R. A. Mason, ‘The Scottish Reformation
and the Origins of Anglo-British Imperialism’, in Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and
the Union of , ed. R. A. Mason (Cambridge, ), –, reprinted in R. A. Mason,

      
From a Scottish and, signally, a British perspective,  is a date
whose resonances are profound and far-reaching. So profound and far-
reaching, indeed, that it seems astonishing that, in , we should be
memorialising Elizabethan England rather than celebrating Jacobean
Britain. To be sure, the emphasis of this conference is on Elizabeth and
the wider world, or at any rate the expansion of England, and there
is clearly a sense in which  was – and perhaps still is – viewed
simply as the absorption of Scotland into an expanding English imperial
system. But there are obvious problems with such a view. After all, leaving
the shambles of Ireland aside, Elizabethan expansionism amounted to
little more than a failed North American colony and some (admittedly
spectacular) piracy and free enterprise overseas trade and exploration. In
fact, Elizabeth’s greatest contribution to the expansion of England was to
die, unmarried and childless. It was the Stewart succession that led to a
substantial extension of the English (or, as James insisted, British) crown’s
dominions, and it was in the reigns of James VI and I and his successors
that the real foundations of overseas empire were laid. In so far as
England expanded at all in Elizabeth’s reign, it was not territorially, but in
terms of self-knowledge and awareness. The last decades of the sixteenth
century witnessed a remarkable cultural renaissance that, inter alia,
saw the creation and enrichment of multiple, over-lapping and often
contradictory English religious, political and legal identities. There is no
little irony in the fact that the final realisation of England’s long-looked-for
hegemony over mainland Britain was brought about by the accession of a
Scottish king whose fanciful notions of a new British monarchy threatened
actually to unEnglish the English. It is perhaps not surprising that the
myth of an Elizabethan golden age – a quintessentially English golden
age – developed so quickly and proved so resilient. In , English self-
perceptions were rudely challenged, first, by the accession of a Scot to
the throne of England, and, second, by the deliberate promotion of ideas
Kingship and the Commonweal: Political Thought in Renaissance and Reformation Scotland (East Linton,
), –.
 A. L. Rowse’s The Expansion of Elizabethan England (), from which this conference
derived its title, is as much concerned with the expansion of Elizabethan civilisation into
England’s Celtic fringes – ‘in various stages of deliquescence, decay and regeneration’
(p. ) – as it is with overseas expansion. In Rowse’s view, however, the latter was clearly an
extension of the former.
 See generally The Oxford History of the British Empire, I: The Origins of Empire, ed. N. Canny
(Oxford, ).
 See A. L. Rowse, The England of Elizabeth (), ch. : ‘The Elizabethan Discovery of
England’; and for a more recent (and less fervently patriotic) treatment, R. Helgerson, Forms
of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England (Chicago and London, ).
 The literature on this theme is reviewed and extended in The Myth of Elizabeth, ed. S.
Doran and T. S. Freeman (Basingstoke, ).
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of Britain that did not necessarily sit comfortably with how the English
viewed themselves and their role in the world.
Needless to say,  confronted the Scots too with challenges to their
self-perceptions and esteem. The union of the crowns brought them into
an uncomfortably close relationship with the ‘auld enemy’, while James
VI and I’s British agenda had implications for the northern kingdom that
were, if anything, even more threatening to Scotland’s historic identity
than they were to England’s. Yet the Scots were perhaps better prepared to
meet these challenges. They had experience enough of being, as it were,
in bed with an elephant; and, if the first half of the sixteenth century
had taught them anything new about their relationship with England, it
was that when the elephant got its act together, as it did briefly in the
‘Rough Wooing’ of the s, its superior weight could be brought to bear
on Scotland with devastating effect. Neither Henry VIII nor Protector
Somerset was able to bring the Scots to heel; nevertheless, they had made
England’s superiority in terms of manpower and money abundantly clear.
At the same time, they had revitalised claims to feudal superiority over
the Scottish kingdom – claims that relegated the Scottish crown to a
mere dependency of its English counterpart – that the Scots had had to
contend with for centuries. Indeed, it was precisely the belief that they
owed no allegiance to the English crown – that they were not in any sense
English – that lay at the heart of the Scots sense of themselves as Scots.
Part of the success of the Stewart dynasty – and, whatever their manifold
individual inadequacies, as a dynasty the Stewarts were phenomenonally
successful – lay in their willingness to identify themselves as the upholders
and defenders of Scottish autonomy in the face of English aggression. It
was no accident that a succession of Stewart monarchs, from James III
to James V, sought to project an image of themselves as emperors within
their own kingdom, wielding supreme jurisdiction within the bounds
of their realm and, crucially, recognising the supremacy of no external
jurisdiction. When James IV married Margaret Tudor in , he did
so as an imperial monarch whose status, lineage and legitimacy – at least
 B. Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland, – (Edinburgh, ); B. Levack,
The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and the Union, – (Oxford, );
J. Wormald, ‘James VI, James I and the Identity of Britain’, in The British Problem, c. –
: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago, ed. B. Bradshaw and J. Morrill (Basingstoke,
), –; A. I. Macinnes, ‘Regal Union for Britain, –’, in The New British History:
Founding a Modern State, –, ed. G. Burgess (London and New York, ), –.
 M. Merriman, The Rough Wooings: Mary Queen of Scots, – (East Linton, ).
 R. A. Mason, ‘Scotching the Brut: Politics, History and National Myth in Sixteenth-
Century Britain’, in Scotland and England, –, ed. R. A. Mason (Edinburgh, ),
–; Mason, Kingship and the Commonweal, –.
 R. A. Mason, ‘This Realm of Scotland Is an Empire? Imperial Ideas and Iconography
in Early Renaissance Scotland’, inChurch, Chronicle and Learning inMedieval and Early Renaissance
Scotland, ed. B. E. Crawford (Edinburgh, ), –.
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in his own estimation – far exceeded that of his upstart and usurping
father-in-law. Stewart monarchs had a bad habit of over-estimating their
power and authority; but historians must be wary of under-estimating
their ambition. In James’s eyes, in marrying Margaret Tudor he was
doing Henry VII a favour (not vice versa), lending the Tudor monarchy
further legitimacy while at the same time positioning the Stewart dynasty
in the English succession. James IV might well have agreed with Henry
VII’s alleged comment on the possibility of dynastic union that the greater
would draw the lesser, but he would have seen such a union as an extension
of the Stewart not the Tudor imperium.
But the imperial pretensions of the Scottish monarchy reached their
high point, not under James IV, but in the latter half of the s, in the
reign of his son and successor, James V. No doubt this was partly inspired
by Henry VIII’s break with Rome and the ringing assertion that ‘this
realm of England is an empire’ on which Henrician caesaropapalism was
founded. James V was as attracted as his uncle by the potential dividends
to be derived from pursuing imperial ideas to their logical conclusion and
asserting royal supremacy over the church. However, James was able to
have his cake and eat it – at least temporarily. That is, he gained massive
financial concessions from the papacy without having to break with Rome,
while at the same time pulling off a stunning dynastic coup by marrying
a Valois princess, thus simultaneously reaffirming both Scotland’s ‘auld
alliance’ with France and its independence of England. It was in this
context, in the afterglow of a lengthy sojourn at the French court of
Francis I, that James’s almost obsessive interest in the iconography of
empire flourished most luxuriantly. That the Stewart monarchy was an
imperial monarchy – that the realm of Scotland was an empire – was
proclaimed as never before in royal architecture, on royal seals, on the
coinage and in the definitive reconstruction of the Scottish crown itself
as an arched or closed imperial one. Such dizzying self-confidence was
 N. Macdougall, James IV (Edinburgh, ), ff. It is worth noting that, in October
, shortly after Henry VIII’s accession to the English throne, Margaret Tudor bore
James IV a son who was baptised Arthur – presumably a conscious recollection of the new
English king’s deceased elder brother, but surely also indicative of the Stewart king’s British
ambitions. The baby died within a year, but significantly James V was also to baptise his
second legitimate male heir, Arthur, in April  (he died the same month). Handbook of
British Chronology, ed. E. B. Fryde et al., rd edn (), –.
 For what follows, see Mason, ‘This Realm of Scotland Is an Empire?’. James V’s reign
is undergoing major scholarly revision and the views presented in standard works such as
G. Donaldson, Scotland: James V – James VII (Edinburgh, ), ch. , are now largely
untenable. See rather J. Cameron, James V: The Personal Rule, – (East Linton, );
C. Edington, Court and Culture in Renaissance Scotland: Sir David Lindsay of the Mount (Amherst,
); Stewart Style, –: Essays on the Court of James V, ed. J. H. Williams (East Linton, );
and A. Thomas, ‘Renaissance Culture at the Court of James V’ (Ph.D. thesis, Edinburgh
University, ).
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perhaps misplaced. Yet the death of James V, aged barely thirty, was no
more the result of hubris than it was of a broken royal will or a broken
royal heart. It was neither military defeat at the hands of the English at
Solway Moss in November  nor the death of his two legitimate male
heirs the previous year that killed the young king. Much more prosaically,
it was plague or cholera that took his life on  December , leaving
the Stewart dynasty hanging by the frail thread of his sole legitimate heir,
Mary, born less than a week before.
It hardly needs saying that, while the succession of an infant female
precipitated a major and enduring crisis for the Stewart dynasty and
the Scottish kingdom, it presented Henry VIII with an unexpected
opportunity to solve England’s Scottish ‘problem’ once and for all. The
betrothal of the young Queen of Scots to his own son and heir, Prince
Edward, promised to effect a dynastic union that would extend Tudor
hegemony throughout the British mainland, while allowing Henry to
pursue the far more interesting prospect of war with France. Yet Henry’s
aggressive pursuit of his objectives served only to alienate even those Scots
who were sympathetic to Anglo-Scottish friendship and unity. It is hard
now to tell how strong the Scottish unionist lobby actually was, but the
case for dynastic union had been powerfully articulated in  by John
Mair or Major of Haddington, best known as a highly influential Parisian
theologian and philosopher, but also the author of a Latin History of
Greater Britain that has the distinction of being the first printed work in
which the case for Anglo-Scottish union was set out at any length. Mair
duly emphasised the geographical logic, as well as the commonality of
language and custom, that made the existence of two separate kingdoms
within one island seem so anomalous. At the same time, however,
he argued that any union between them must be based on parity of
status and esteem. Whatever the inequalities of wealth, population and
resources, a union founded on English assumptions of feudal and cultural
superiority would prove unacceptable to Scots who, like Mair himself,
were intensely proud of their ancestors’ successful struggle to maintain
the Scottish kingdom’s independence of England. To some extent, these
preoccupations surface in the treaties of Greenwich of  through which
Henry’s desire for union appeared on the point of being realised. The
reiterated concern to preserve the Scottish kingdom’s ancient laws and
liberties may owe more to fear of intensive English government and heavy
 Cameron, James V, –.
 D. M. Head, ‘Henry VIII’s Scottish Policy: A Reassessment’, Scottish Historical Review,
 (), –; Merriman, Rough Wooings, esp. ch. .
 John Major, A History of Greater Britain as well England as Scotland, ed. and trans. A.
Constable (Scottish History Society, X, ). For commentary, see Mason, Kingship and the
Commonweal, ch. .
      
English taxation than to the theorising of John Mair. Nonetheless, the
treaties looked forward to a union of the crowns, but not to a union of the
kingdoms.
In any event, the treaties proved a dead letter – neither side had any
confidence in the other – and Scottish suspicions that Henry VIII was
intent on subjugating their kingdom seemed to be amply confirmed by
the brutal military campaigns that ensued and that left a trail of death and
destruction throughout southern Scotland. The English crown’s claim to
feudal superiority over Scotland was once again invoked and the Scots
reacted predictably, branding the English as heretic spawn of the devil,
and reasserting the historic and continuing autonomy of their kingdom.
It was to all intents and purposes a replay of the Scottish resistance to
Edward I, the only ideological difference – though a crucially important
one – being the introduction of a potentially explosive religious dimension
to the conflict. Oddly, this was not an issue that seemed to concern
Henry VIII. Indeed, he seems never even to have recast his belief in
English feudal superiority over Scotland in the imperial language that
would have lent real weight and substance to the belief that, in breaking
free of Rome, England had recovered its imperial status. It was only
following Henry’s death in , and the accession of Edward VI under
the protection of the duke of Somerset, that religion became central to
England’s Scottish policy, and that the war effort was justified in terms of
a providential opportunity to create an explicitly British kingdom that was
both Protestant and imperial. Paradoxically, not only were Scots at the
forefront of the propaganda campaign that first popularised the idea of
a Protestant Britain, but in their enthusiasm for it they were prepared
to jettison all the elaborate historical lore that had been developed
to underpin Scottish freedom from English overlordship. Instead, they
argued that from the earliest times the Scottish realm had been part of
a greater English imperium – albeit an imperium that was more accurately
named Britain or even Great Britain – and that the marriage of Mary
Stewart to Edward Tudor heralded, not the creation, but the re-creation
of an ancient British empire. In the s the alleged British origins of the
 Merriman, Rough Wooings, –.
 The English claim had been fully set out on Henry VIII’s behalf just prior to James
V’s death in A Declaration, Conteynyng the Iust Causes and Consyderations of this Present Warre with
the Scottis, wherin alsoo Appereth the Trew & Right Title that the Kinges Most Royall Maiesty Hath to
the Souerayntue of Scotlande (), reprinted in The Complaynt of Scotlande, ed. J. A. H. Murray
(Early English Text Society, ), –.
 For this and what follows, see Mason, Kingship and the Commonweal, –; D. Armitage,
The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, ), ch. .
 See in particular James Henrisoun (or Harryson), An Exhortacion to the Scottes to Conforme
Themselves to the Honourable, Expedient & Godly Union betweene the Realmes of England & Scotland
(), reprinted in Complaynt of Scotlande, ed. Murray, –.
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Emperor Constantine had been invoked to justify the claim that the realm
of England was an empire. By the late s, the first Christian emperor
had become a symbolic precedent for an empire that was explicitly
British – or, perhaps more accurately, Anglo-British – as well as em-
phatically Protestant.
Although the ‘Edwardian Moment’ proved fleeting enough, the
Constantinian vision of a Protestant and imperial British kingdom
survived it and would be reinvigorated, albeit in somewhat more muted
form, in the early years of Elizabeth’s reign. Meanwhile, of course, in
desperation the Scots entered into a dynastic alliance with France that
effectively ceded to the Valois dynasty the sovereignty over their kingdom
that they had consistently denied the Tudors, while in England the
accession of Mary and her marriage to Philip II promised a return to
the Catholic fold under Habsburg dominance. Rather than being the
seat of an impregnable Protestant and imperial monarchy, Britain in the
s looked set to be balkanised by Catholic superpowers with their own
imperial agendas. In the event, as France and Spain fought each other to
a standstill, Mary Tudor died in  and the Valois king, Henry II, was
accidentally killed the following year in a tournament held to celebrate
the outbreak of peace with Spain. Just as Elizabeth now found herself
queen of England, able to reassert the crown’s imperial authority and
impose a moderately Protestant religious settlement, so Mary Stewart
suddenly found herself queen of France as well as Scotland, controlled
by a Guise family network intent on pressing her Catholic claim to the
English throne. In such a context, as discontent with French Catholic
rule in Scotland flared into open rebellion, there was renewed hope for
Protestantism throughout Britain.
To be sure, in , most English politicians were much more exercised
by the loss of Calais to the French than they were by the ever more
desperate pleas for assistance emanating from the north. Yet there
were those, like Elizabeth’s secretary, William Cecil, who were not
only sympathetic to the Edwardian vision of a Protestant and imperial
Britain – Cecil had actually accompanied Somerset on his later Scottish
campaigns – but who saw amity and ultimately union with Scotland
 On the ‘Edwardian Moment’, and the subsequent influence of these ideas, see A. H.
Williamson, Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI (Edinburgh, ), ch. .
 P. Ritchie, Mary of Guise in Scotland, –: A Political Career (East Linton, ),
esp. chs. –, on the significance of the ‘protectoral’ alliance established by the treaty of
Haddington in .
 For a brief recent analysis of the British dimension of the Scottish Reformation, see
C. Kellar, Scotland, England and the Reformation, – (Oxford, ), esp. ch. ; see also
J. E. A. Dawson, The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary Queen of Scots: The Earl of Argyll and the
Struggle for Britain and Ireland (Cambridge, ), ch. .
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as fundamental to England’s long-term security. English foreign policy
would thus be orientated away from the chimera of French conquests
and concentrate instead on securing England’s hegemony in Britain and
Ireland. As in the late s, moreover, strategic pragmatism might be
couched in the language of Protestant apocalypticism. For what was
unfolding in – was surely the workings of divine providence, a
God-given opportunity to effect the peaceful conjunction of the two
realms that had been so foolishly spurned in the s and that had
reaped the divine retribution of the s. Elizabeth, in short, might
yet emerge in the s as a British as well as an English Constantine.
Yet, however urgent, providential and apocalyptic its significance, such
a vision of a Protestant and imperial Britain was beset by problems that
would continue to dog the cause of Anglo-Scottish union throughout the
Elizabethan period and beyond. First, it was by no means clear in –
 that Elizabeth was willing or able to play the key role assigned to her.
Second, it was based on sweeping aside the claim of Mary Stewart not
only to be the legitimate Queen of Scots but also to have a rightful place
in the English succession. And third, this essentially Anglocentric vision of
Britain’s imperial destiny took little or no account of Scottish sensibilities.
It is on these issues as they worked themselves out in Elizabeth’s reign
that the remainder of this paper is focused.
It perhaps hardly needs saying that the idea of Elizabeth acting
out the role of a godly British Constantine, delivering the people of
Scotland as well as England from the thraldom of popery, proved as
spectacular a piece of miscasting as could be imagined. Elizabeth had
no sympathy with the kind of apocalyptic scenarios that saw her leading
British – or, still worse, European – Protestantism in a final showdown
with the antichristian church of Rome. Constantine was a convenient
enough means of legitimising royal authority over the English church,
but Elizabeth betrayed no interest in extending her imperial remit to
encompass her northern neighbour. If she had a long-term Scottish
policy, let alone a vision of Britain, it is remarkably hard to discern what
it was. Certainly, Cecil was able to cajole her into embarking on what
proved to be a decisive intervention on behalf of Scottish Protestantism
in –, but it was reluctant and half-hearted – and was emphatically
 J. E. A. Dawson, ‘William Cecil and the British Dimension of Early Elizabethan Foreign
Policy’, History,  (), –; S. Alford, The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the
British Succession Crisis, – (Cambridge, ).
 Significantly, the dedication of the  edition of John Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, in
which Elizabeth is closely identified with the Emperor Constantine, is quietly dropped
from subsequent editions – a measure of Foxe’s own disenchantment with the queen’s
understanding of the limited nature of her religious role; see further T. S. Freeman,
‘Providence and Prescription: The Account of Elizabeth in Foxe’s “Book of Martyrs” ’,
in Myth of Elizabeth, ed. Doran and Freeman, –.
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not born of an ideological commitment to a Protestant and imperial
British kingdom. Elizabeth’s reluctance is perhaps understandable: cash-
strapped and insecure, she had no desire to embroil herself in a war
with France such as had undermined and eventually destroyed Protector
Somerset. Moreover, deeply conscious of her own sovereign rights, she
had an evident distaste for interfering with those of another kingdom and
sister queen. Thus Elizabeth remained unmoved by the claim to feudal
superiority over Scotland which had so excited her father and which Cecil
was not slow to resurrect. In so far as Elizabeth had a Scottish policy – and
one is tempted to say that her policy was actually not to have a policy – it
was limited to short-term measures, pursued at minimal expense, aimed
at defending her own dynastic rights and securing England’s northern
frontier.
As a result, the hopes harboured by Cecil and at least some of his
Scottish allies that Anglo-Scottish amity and union might be secured
immediately by setting aside Mary Stewart’s claim to the Scottish throne
and marrying Elizabeth off to the Hamilton heirs presumptive, was little
more than pie in the sky. Elizabeth would have none of it. In any
event, the death in December  of Mary Stewart’s husband, the
French king Francis II, and the Scottish queen’s decision to return to
her native kingdom, put paid to the fevered marital speculations of the
advocates of a Protestant Britain. Whoever else Elizabeth might marry,
it would not be Mary. Yet, though dynastic union appeared to have
reached an impasse, strenuous efforts continued to be made to find an
accommodation between the two queens which would settle the English
succession while advancing, or at least not prejudicing, the Protestant
British cause. Once again, however, Elizabeth’s unwillingness to discuss
either the succession or her own marital plans ensured that these tortuous
negotiations got nowhere. By July , when Mary took matters into her
own hands and married by Catholic rite Henry Stewart, Lord Darnley,
heir to the earl of Lennox, grandson of Margaret Tudor and second only
to Mary herself in the English succession, the proponents of Protestant
union were in despair. Indeed, by the end of the following year, when Mary
staged an elaborate Catholic baptism for her son and heir, Charles James,
the future James VI and I, it was Britain’s Catholic community that had
reason to celebrate. However, any hopes of a Catholic succession to the
British thrones were quickly dashed by the bizarre and self-destructive acts
that led within a matter of months to Mary’s imprisonment and enforced
abdication. Clearly, Mary’s enemies in Scotland were not motivated solely
or even primarily by the desire for Anglo-Scottish union. Nonetheless,
 Kellar, Scotland, England and the Reformation, –.
 M. Lynch, ‘Queen Mary’s Triumph: The Baptismal Celebrations at Stirling in
December ’, Scottish Historical Review,  (), –.
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with Mary in prison and her son in the hands of a committed Protestant
regent, it was possible once again to think in terms of the amity and
ultimately union that were fundamental to the British agenda.
It is perhaps not surprising that such an agenda was no more
meaningfully pursued after  than it had been in –. After all,
Elizabeth’s understanding of the matter had not substantially altered:
she remained no more willing to play the British Constantine than she
was to countenance the deposition of a fellow monarch. Mary’s escape
from prison and flight to England afforded Elizabeth the opportunity of
furthering the cause of a united Protestant Britain simply by extinguishing
Mary as the main focus of Catholic opposition to it. But while many of
her subjects, as well as many Scots, bayed for the deposed queen’s blood,
Elizabeth refused to satisfy them. So unwilling was she to violate the rights
of a fellow sovereign, that she would rather have had Mary restored
than executed. The result was the uneasy compromise that saw Mary
incarcerated in England while Elizabeth lent unenthusiastic support to
the succession of Protestant regents who governed Scotland in the name of
James VI. Even the earl of Morton, the most enthusiastically pro-English
as well as the longest serving of those regents, was offered only minimal
and grudging support – and refused a pension. Elizabeth simply was not
interested and the British strategy that had once so excited at least some of
her councillors quietly slipped from the agenda. As a result, Morton’s fall
in  caught the Elizabethan regime almost totally unawares, while
the baronial factionalism that characterised the last years of James’s
minority remained an unfathomable – though occasionally threatening –
mystery.
Commenting on this phase of Anglo-Scottish relations, Wallace
MacCaffrey once wrote that Elizabeth’s ‘attitude to Scottish politicians
was not very different from that of her later successors towards
troublesome tribal neighbours on the fringes of empire’. It is hard to
disagree. Elizabeth treated the Scots with a cynical disdain that was born
not just of personal prejudice but of assumptions that were deeply rooted
in English culture. Just as the claim to English feudal superiority drew
inspiration from Geoffrey of Monmouth’s twelfth-century History of the
Kings of Britain, so English attitudes to their neighbours were moulded
by the ethnology of his close contemporary, Gerald of Wales. On the
cultural spectrum that lay between English civility and Irish barbarism,
 Alford, Early Elizabethan Polity, chs. –; Dawson, Politics of Religion, ch. .
 K. M. Brown, ‘The Price of Friendship: The “Well-affected” and English Economic
Clientage in Scotland before ’, in Scotland and England, ed. Mason, –, at –.
 W. MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I (), .
 See, for example, H. Morgan, ‘Giraldus Cambrensis and the Tudor Conquest of
Ireland’, in Political Ideology in Ireland, –, ed. H. Morgan (Dublin, ), –.
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the Scots were evidently closer to savagery than they were to civilisation.
When, in , William Harrison wrote the Description of Britain that
prefaced Holinshed’sChronicles, he not only drew on the unionist literature
of the ‘Edwardian Moment’ to substantiate the English claim to ‘the
souereigntie of this Ile’, but also pilloried the (admittedly ancient) Scots
as uncivilised barbarians ‘who used to feed on the buttocks of boies
and womens paps, as delicate dishes’. It is fair enough to highlight
the development of an Anglo-Scottish Protestant culture that served to
promote British integration and unity in the later sixteenth century.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to under-estimate the depth and enduring
power of age-old ethnic prejudices. As King James was to discover after
, only a radical change of ‘hearts and minds’ would make possible
his vision of a united British kingdom.
Meanwhile, in the early s, James was emerging from a long and
tumultuous minority. In August  he was forcibly kidnapped by the
Ruthven Raiders, a coalition of Protestant nobles who had seen the
meteoric rise of Esme´ Stuart, a cousin of Darnley whom James elevated
to the dukedom of Lennox, both as a threat to their own power and as a
potentially sinister re-grouping of a Catholic, pro-Marian alliance. The
following year James made good his escape and, while it is remarkably
difficult to determine exactly when his personal rule began, by the mid-
s he was no longer simply a prisoner of factional interests. In the
so-called ‘Black Acts’ of  he set out a legislative framework that
was clearly intended as a reassertion of royal authority over both church
and state. Indeed, as the archbishop of St Andrews, Patrick Adamson,
made clear in his printed commentary on the acts, James was emperor
in his own kingdom, a Scottish Constantine whose writ must run over
ecclesiastical as well as civil affairs. As he emerged from his minority, the
young Scottish king was intent on reaffirming the imperial status claimed
by his Stewart ancestors. At the same time, of course, he was acutely
aware of his place in the English succession and intent on ingratiating
himself with – or at least not alienating – potential supporters in the
Elizabethan regime. For their part, Elizabeth and her councillors were
rather slow to respond to James’s emergence as a ruler in his own right.
It was not so much the appearance on the political scene of an adult,
 Raphael Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland (London, –), I, pp. ,
.
 J. E. A. Dawson, ‘Anglo-Scottish Protestant Culture and Integration in Sixteenth-
Century Britain’, in Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, –, ed. S. G. Ellis and
S. Barber (London and New York, ), –.
 See J. Goodare, ‘Scottish Politics in the Reign of James VI’, in The Reign of James VI, ed.
J. Goodare and M. Lynch (East Linton, ), –.
 Patrick Adamson, A Declaration of the Kings Maiesties Intentioun and Meaning toward the Lait
Actis of Parliament (Edinburgh, ); Mason, Kingship and the Commonweal, –.
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male and independent rival to Elizabeth’s authority within Britain that
concentrated the English mind. Rather it was the looming threat of
war with Spain that led, in July , to the drawing up of an Anglo-
Scottish league that, while offering James no explicit recognition of his
right as Elizabeth’s successor, gave his cause tacit support in the form of
an annual pension. However, the real price of accommodation with the
Elizabethan regime would only become apparent later that year when
James’s mother was finally tried and condemned for treason.
As a means of teasing out Scottish attitudes to Elizabeth and
Elizabethan England, it is well worth dwelling on the events surrounding
the execution of Mary Queen of Scots. Elizabeth’s own agonising over
the act, and subsequent denial that she was responsible for it, are well
known and need not detain us further. Less often remarked upon is
the popular Scottish outrage at the deed. James himself, in a famous
letter of protest against his mother’s trial and sentence, not only reflected
with a singular lack of diplomatic tact on Elizabeth’s father’s nasty habit
of beheading his bedfellows, but went on to comment that he hardly
dared to go outdoors ‘for crieng oute of the whole people; and what ys
spoken by them of the quene of England, yt greves me to heare, and
yet [I] darre not fynd faulte with yt except I would dethrone myself,
so ys whole Scottland incensed with this matter’. James was no doubt
exaggerating for effect. It is notable, for example, that when he ordered
the Edinburgh ministers to pray for his mother, they ‘obstenatlie refusit’.
The more radical of the Scots clergy evidently saw no reason to regret the
passing of a daughter of Antichrist. Perhaps less predictably, however, the
Scottish nobility was almost literally up in arms at what they construed
as Mary’s unlawful murder. At a convention in May  and again
at a parliament summoned in July, they begged James to revenge his
mother’s murder, vowing to assist with men and money, ‘sa lang as ather
blude or breath may last’. Whatever their view of Mary as a person, the
nobility’s pride was deeply hurt by what they saw as England’s typically
high-handed treatment of their exiled queen. Yet, as Elizabeth and her
councillors had calculated, this atavistic response, symptomatic though
it was of the deep distrust that lingered between the two kingdoms,
proved short-lived. James thanked his nobility for their offer of arms
 H. G. Stafford, James VI of Scotland and the Throne of England (New York and London,
), –, ; J. Goodare, ‘James VI’s English Subsidy’, in Reign of James VI, ed. Goodare
and Lynch, –.
 For a recent treatment, see J. Guy, ‘My Heart is My Own’: The Life of Mary Queen of Scots
(London and New York, ), –.
 King James’s Secret: Negotiations between Elizabeth and James VI relating to the Execution of Mary
Queen of Scots, from the Warrender Papers, ed. R. S. Rait and A. I. Dunlop (), –.
 The Historie and Life of King James the Sext, –, ed. T. Thomson (Bannatyne Club,
XIV, ), .
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and men, but promised only ‘to do tharein as tyme and occasioun sould
permit’.
Time and occasion, and the looming threat of Spanish invasion,
ensured that the Scots never mounted their threatened invasion of
England and that James remained true to the  accord with Elizabeth.
Like Elizabeth, James no doubt shared the view attributed to his envoy,
the master of Gray – a view for which Gray was later banished – that
‘the dead don’t bite (mortui non mordent)’. But neither James nor Elizabeth
could openly admit that they had wilfully violated the sanctity of the royal
office or tampered with the inviolable principle of indefeasible hereditary
right. It was probably easier for James to square his conscience than for
Elizabeth. He had had no direct hand in the murky business and, provided
Mary’s treason left no stain on his own honour and did not jeopardise
his own place in the English succession, he had little reason to mourn
a mother whom he had never known and whose very existence was a
political and dynastic liability. In his Memoirs, Sir James Melville of Halhill
commented that, on ripe consideration, James decided not to disturb
the peace of the English kingdom by attempting to avenge an evil act
perpetrated, not by Elizabeth, but by her misguided councillors. Instead,
Melville added astutely, because Elizabeth was ‘of good years and not
like to live long’, James might as well bide his time and wreak vengeance
once he had come into his rightful inheritance. In the summer of ,
James turned twenty-one, while Elizabeth was nearing her fifty-fourth
birthday. Elizabeth’s grandfather, Henry VII, had died aged fifty-two;
her father, Henry VIII, aged fifty-five; and her half-sister, Mary Tudor,
aged forty-two. By any reasonable actuarial calculus, James’s accession
to the English throne was imminent. He was not to know that Elizabeth
would defy all the actuarial odds and live not for five more years, nor
even for ten, but for fifteen and more.
It was a long time to wait, and a tense and frustrating one too, for James
could never be totally certain that his succession to the English throne
would go unchallenged. It is no surprise that, in the course of the s,
as this most literate and intelligent of kings reflected on the nature of
kingship, he should develop a theory of divine right monarchy, based on
indefeasible hereditary right and the free, absolute – and, by implication,
imperial – authority vested in his person. His thoughts were as much on
 Ibid., , .
 Ibid., –; King James’s Secret, ed. Rait and Dunlop, –, –.
 Memoirs of Sir James Melville of Halhill, –, ed. A. F. Steuart (), .
 P. Croft, King James (Basingstoke, ), –, summarises these concerns and details
some of the king’s clandestine correspondence over the succession with English courtiers
ranging from Essex to Lord Henry Howard and Robert Cecil.
 Notably in his The True Lawe of Free Monarchies (), reprinted in King James VI and I,
the Political Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge, ), –.
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England, and on Catholic opposition to his succession there, as they were
on Scotland. Meanwhile, as Elizabeth’s last decade wore interminably
on, it was in Scotland that some of the most interesting speculation on
the future of Britain emerged. In , for example, Andrew Melville, in
the unlikely guise of a court poet, celebrated the birth and baptism of
James’s first male heir, Prince Henry, by articulating a vision of united
Britain that openly challenged the imperial ideas of the king himself.
Melville was not only a Calvinist revolutionary, but also a civic humanist,
the friend and in some respects the intellectual heir of James’s former
tutor and beˆte noir, George Buchanan. Like Buchanan, he was fiercely
opposed to the idea of empire, not just on the presbyterian grounds
that the royal supremacy was incompatible with the independence of
the church, but also because it sapped the civic energy on which political
participation depended, turning subjects into slaves rather than citizens.
Like that other Scottish presbyterian unionist, David Hume of Godscroft,
Melville envisaged Britain, not as an empire, but as some sort of godly
confederation whose constituent polities would be covenanted with each
other as well as with God.
Melville and Godscroft were hardly representative of broadly based
Scottish opinion. Nevertheless, their views are worth noting because they
indicate that, by the mid-s, some Scots were not just reconciled to the
prospect of union, but were intellectually excited by its possibilities. To be
sure, as the post- unionist literature makes clear, they worried about
Scotland’s status within a united Britain – fearing, as the pro-union lawyer
John Russell put it, that Scotland would become ‘subalterne’ to England
and ‘thairby ancienne Scotland to loss hir beauty for evir! God forbid!’ –
and probably only a handful would have subscribed to Godscroft’s
Calvinist republican reconfiguration of its polity. But it was the Scots
rather than the English who were exercised and even energised by the
idea of Britain and it was Scots who led the way in developing a language
and conceptual framework capable of articulating an understanding of
Britain’s multiple monarchy as something other than the product of a
 Principis Scoti-Britannorum natalia, printed in the original Latin with English translation
in George Buchanan, The Political Poetry, ed. and trans. P. J. McGinnis and A. H. Williamson
(Scottish History Society, fifth series, VIII, ), –. The poem was not well received in
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in Reign of James VI, ed. Goodare and Lynch, –, at .
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dynastic lottery. As a Scot, and the first British king, James VI and I not
unnaturally shared this enthusiasm and was prepared to experiment with
the governance of his multiple monarchy – so long as it reinforced rather
than undermined his own authority. But his campaign for closer and more
complete union, and for the fashioning of a new British identity, met with
either stony English silence or vocal English resistance. As a result, he was
inclined to fall back on variations of the Anglo-British imperial ideology
first articulated in the late s, an ideology that allowed the new Britain
to be construed as little more than old England writ large.
Yet one cannot help thinking that, when James gloried in his Constant-
inian and even Arthurian inheritance, he understood it to mean some-
thing different from Elizabeth’s understanding of it: expansive, perhaps
even transoceanic, rather than insular and introverted. Commenting
on the view that Henry VIII was possessed of a grand British imperial
vision, J. J. Scarisbrick expressed doubt that the English king was
‘either guilty or capable of such high statesmanship’. In this respect, as
apparently in so many others, Elizabeth was entirely her father’s daughter.
In circumstances that were far more favourable to Anglo-Scottish concord
and integration, when indeed the future of Britain was hers to shape, she
chose to do as little as possible. For better or for worse, Britain and its
empire owe far more to James Stewart than they do to Elizabeth Tudor.
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